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Abstract
The cooperative breeding hypothesis (CBH) states that cooper-
ative breeding, a social system in which group members help
to rear offspring that are not their own, has important socio-
cognitive consequences. Thornton & McAuliffe (2015; hence-
forth T&M) critiqued this idea on both conceptual and empiri-
cal grounds, arguing that there is no reason to predict that
cooperative breeding should favour the evolution of enhanced
social cognition or larger brains, nor any clear evidence that
it does. In response to this critique, Burkart & van Schaik
(2016; henceforth B&vS) attempt to clarify the causal logic of
the CBH, revisit the data and raise the possibility that the
hypothesis may only apply to primates. They concede that
cooperative breeding is unlikely to generate selection pressures
for enhanced socio-cognitive abilities, but argue instead that
the CBH operates purely through cooperative breeding reduc-
ing social or energetic constraints. Here, we argue that this
revised hypothesis is also untenable because: (1) it cannot
explain why resources so released would be allocated to cogni-
tive traits per se rather than any other ﬁtness-related traits, (2)
key assumptions are inconsistent with available evidence and
(3) ambiguity regarding the predictions leaves it unclear what
evidence would be required to falsify it. Ultimately, the
absence of any compelling evidence that cooperative breeding
is associated with elevated cognitive ability or large brains (in-
deed data suggest the opposite is true in non-human primates)
also casts doubt on the capacity of the CBH to explain varia-
tion in cognitive traits.
Keywords
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Introduction
Part of the difﬁculty in assessing the CBH is that its causal
logic has been presented in two distinct forms. At times, the
arguments are presented in the language of natural selection
and adaptation. For example Burkart & van Schaik (2010) sug-
gest that wolves have ‘socio-cognitive adaptations to coopera-
tive breeding’ (p. 12) and discuss ‘the selection pressures
associated with extensive allomaternal care’ (p. 14). This
seems to frame the CBH as an adaptive hypothesis, similar to
the social intelligence or social brain hypotheses (Humphrey,
1976; Dunbar, 1998), positing that cooperative breeding gener-
ates selection for enhanced socio-cognitive abilities. In their
response to our critique, B&vS agree that such an adaptive
argument is untenable: ‘we can only agree with T&M’s con-
clusion that “there is no evidence that [the cognitive and moti-
vational processes found in cooperative breeders] are either
unique to cooperative breeders or particularly cognitively
demanding” and “that there is little evidence to suggest that
cooperative breeding entails distinct cognitive challenges”’. If
cooperative breeding does not generate novel selection pres-
sures on cognitive processes, then it follows that there are no
novel beneﬁts for enhanced cognition or large brains in coop-
erative breeders. What then does the CBH have to offer?
The more common version of the CBH (which B&vS now
advocate as the only correct version) suggests that cooperative
breeding has no causal selective consequences for social cogni-
tion, but somehow ‘as a side effect. . . can facilitate perfor-
mance in socio-cognitive tasks’ (B&vS, 2016, p. 1). Critically,
this perspective is based purely on the putative relaxation of
social or energetic constraints associated with cooperative
breeding, with no consideration of beneﬁts (see also Dunbar &
Shultz, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2012). However, if, as B&vS
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acknowledge, there are no novel cognitive challenges associ-
ated with cooperative breeding, then there is no reason to pre-
dict that resources freed by reduced constraints should be
reallocated preferentially to cognition and brains rather than
any other ﬁtness-enhancing traits.
B&vS outline three components to their hypothesis, which
are captured in the following statement: ‘The cooperative
breeding hypothesis posits that the immediate tasks associated
with extensive allomaternal care require motivational proximate
mechanisms, such as increased social tolerance or proactive
prosociality which, as a side effect, also can facilitate perfor-
mance in socio-cognitive tasks. Eventually, over evolutionary
time this constellation may also, under speciﬁc conditions,
facilitate increases in brain size.’ (p. 1). Below, we evaluate
the logic and evidence for the three key components of this
argument in turn.
(1) ‘the immediate tasks associated
with extensive allomaternal care
require motivational proximate
mechanisms, such as increased social
tolerance or proactive prosociality’
Logic
In the context of the CBH – a hypothesis about the consequences
of cooperative breeding – this statement conﬂates allomaternal
and alloparental care. Allomaternal care (which B&vS consider
to encompass all care provided by non-mothers, and so includes
paternal care) is widespread, particularly in monogamous sys-
tems including most birds and some mammals (e.g. some social
carnivores, and primates such as owl and titi monkeys; Fernan-
dez-Duque, Valeggia & Mendoza, 2009; Lukas & Clutton-Brock,
2013) where fathers as well as mothers contribute to raising
young. Cooperative breeding, where non-parents contribute to
care (‘alloparental’ care), is thought to have frequently evolved
from such monogamous systems (Hughes et al., 2008; Cornwal-
lis et al., 2010; Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 2012). Critically, B&vS
proffer no reason to predict that this alloparental care in coopera-
tive breeders should be underpinned by mechanisms other than
those already regulating maternal and/or paternal care in monoga-
mous species. Such mechanisms may include, as T&M discussed
in the original critique, hormonal priming and responsiveness to
signals from young, which may be either active (e.g. begging) or
passive (infants’ features themselves act as a signal to solicit
care) (for callitrichid examples, see da Silva Mota, Franci & De
Sousa, 2006; Barbosa & da Silva Mota, 2013).
Evidence
Increased social tolerance in cooperative breeders
B&vS’s argument places strong emphasis on species-level indices
of social tolerance estimated from captive individuals (Burkart
et al., 2014), but the generalizability and ecological relevance of
these ﬁndings questionable. Cooperatively breeding species vary
widely in group size and structure, degree of reproductive skew
and the extent to which skew arises from overt conﬂict (Cant &
Young, 2013; Silk & House, 2016). Levels of ‘social tolerance’
therefore vary widely among cooperative breeders.
Increased proactive prosociality in cooperative
breeders
The evidence here centres on captive experiments suggesting
that callitrichids are more likely than other primate species to
perform tasks that directly reward others (Burkart et al., 2007,
2014). Putting aside methodological critiques of the experimen-
tal design (Thornton & McAuliffe, 2015), these results appear
to have little bearing on the CBH’s arguments, because they
measure behaviour that (1) is not ‘associated with extensive
allomaternal care’ (B&vS, 2016, p. 1) and (2) is extremely rare
or absent under natural conditions (see below). Whereas proso-
ciality experiments focus on voluntary, unsolicited food dona-
tions, largely between adults, the evidence shows that, to quote
a paper in which Burkart is a co-author, food donation in cal-
litrichids under natural conditions occurs ‘almost exclusively
from adults to their offspring/[younger] siblings. . .most sharing
events fall under the category of tolerated theft occurring in
response to begging. . .[and] a high percentage of resistance is
reported’ (Bullinger et al., 2013; see also references cited by
T&M). In their response to T&M’s critique, B&vS cite a con-
ference abstract to support the claim that 10% of food dona-
tions by captive marmosets occur between adults. We are
puzzled by this choice of reference as the published abstract
does not mention this ﬁgure and only describes adults sharing
food with young (Martins & Burkart, 2013). More importantly,
reports of food transfers among adult callitrichids in the wild
are largely restricted to instances of theft by the dominant
female (Garber, 1997). Thus, the evidence casts serious doubt
on the apparent assumption that cooperative breeding is associ-
ated with elevated levels of proactive prosociality.
(2) ‘. . .which, as a side effect, also can
facilitate performance in socio-
cognitive tasks’
Logic
B&vS suggest two means by which such a side effect may
come about. First, the contributions of helpers may lighten the
costs of reproduction for breeding females, allowing them to
invest more resources in producing offspring with large brains,
which in turn support enhanced cognitive performance (Bur-
kart, Hrdy & Van Schaik, 2009; Burkart & van Schaik, 2010;
Isler & van Schaik, 2012). However, this hypothesis (1) pro-
vides no explanation for why cooperative breeders should
invest these resources in enlarged offspring brains, and (2) evi-
dently does not hold for non-human primates, where coopera-
tive breeders have unusually small brains (Reader &
MacDonald, 2002). We return to these issues in section 3.
Second, B&vS suggest that the elevated levels of social tol-
erance and prosociality they claim are found in cooperative
breeders (though see section 1 above) provide a benign social
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environment in which pre-existing socio-cognitive traits can be
manifested to a greater degree (Burkart et al., 2009; Burkart &
van Schaik, 2010). B&vS seem to assume that a reduction in
levels of competition and conﬂict will automatically generate
enhanced performance in what they term socio-cognitive tasks
such as social learning and teaching. For instance, they claim
that ‘social learning is per deﬁnition more efﬁcient than indi-
vidual learning’ (B&vS, 2016, p. 5) implying that animals
would always learn socially if only social circumstances per-
mitted it. This ignores the vast body of literature showing that
social learning can be unreliable, generating trade-offs with
more accurate but more costly individual learning (Boyd &
Richerson, 1985; Kendal et al., 2005; Rieucau & Giraldeau,
2011). Where social learning occurs, it is not simply an emer-
gent product of a tolerant social structure, but a response to
particular demands arising from factors such as foraging ecol-
ogy, predation pressure and resource distribution that affect the
beneﬁts of social learning (Thornton & Clutton-Brock, 2011;
Smolla et al., 2015). Thus, there is no reason to predict that
cooperative breeding per se (even if it was associated with a
more benign social environment; see above) should be associ-
ated with a higher prevalence of social learning, all other
things being equal.
A similar argument holds for teaching. Thornton and col-
leagues have suggested that the costs of teaching may be
reduced in cooperative breeders because they are divided
among multiple helpers (Thornton, 2008; Thornton & Raihani,
2008). However, this cost reduction alone cannot explain the
emergence of teaching, unless we also consider the beneﬁts.
Teaching is expected to evolve where the costs to teachers of
promoting learning in pupils are outweighed by the ﬁtness ben-
eﬁts they accrue once pupils have learned. These beneﬁts will
be scaled by the utility of the information to be learned: if it is
easy to learn through individual or social learning and/or is of
relatively low ﬁtness value, the beneﬁts are unlikely to out-
weigh the costs (Thornton & Raihani, 2008; Fogarty, Strimling
& Laland, 2011). This illustrates why the presence of coopera-
tive breeding alone has no explanatory power in understanding
the distribution of teaching. For instance, consider meerkats
and banded mongooses. Both are cooperatively breeding mon-
goose species, but the former relies heavily on difﬁcult-to-catch
and potentially dangerous prey such as scorpions (Thornton &
McAuliffe, 2006), whereas the latter predominantly eats slow-
moving or immobile invertebrate prey (Rood, 1975). This
explains why there is strong evidence for teaching in meerkats
(Thornton & McAuliffe, 2006), but none in banded mon-
gooses.
Evidence
Social learning
B&vS acknowledge that there is no evidence that cooperative
breeders show an elevated ability to learn socially, but suggest
instead that ‘ceteris paribus they are more likely to do so’
(B&vS, 2016, p. 4). However, there is no support for this sug-
gestion. The review by Custance, Whiten & Fredman (2002)
on which B&vS base their arguments shows no statistically
detectable difference in the occurrence of social learning
between callitrichids and capuchins in controlled captive exper-
iments (see discussion in T&M). Similarly, Reader’s (2003)
systematic review found that the prevalence of social learning
in wild callitrichids was low compared to capuchins and other
social primates. We also note that while capuchins are reported
to exhibit social conventions transmitted through social learn-
ing (Perry, 2011), no such culturally transmitted forms of
social behaviour have been reported in callitrichids.
Teaching
The ﬁeld of animal teaching is in its infancy and more data
are needed, but current evidence does not indicate a systematic
bias towards cooperative breeders. There is certainly strong
experimental evidence for teaching in a number of cooperative
breeders (Franks & Richardson, 2006; Thornton & McAuliffe,
2006; Raihani & Ridley, 2008; Colombelli-Negrel et al.,
2012), but there is also compelling (albeit observational) evi-
dence from many independent breeders, and a broad survey of
all the putative examples of teaching showed no clear biases
(Thornton & Raihani, 2008). Among primates, no study has
yet demonstrated that knowledgeable individuals act to facili-
tate learning in others. Further data are needed to establish
whether or not some callitrichids teach, but at the moment the
weight of evidence is comparable to that for independently
breeding macaques (Maestripieri, 1995, 1996; Masataka et al.,
2009).
(3) ‘Eventually, over evolutionary
time, this constellation may also,
under specific conditions, facilitate
increases in brain size’
Logic
This is perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the CBH. As we
and others have noted, a release of resource constraints
through load-lightening effects of helpers on breeders’ repro-
ductive effort cannot explain why selection would act to
invest those surplus resources in the relative brain size of off-
spring, rather than any other resource-constrained ﬁtness-
enhancing trait, such as offspring number or body size, or
indeed maternal longevity (Bourke, 2007; Dunbar & Shultz,
2007; Tomasello et al., 2012; Thornton & McAuliffe, 2015).
Thus, if we are to understand the evolution of increased brain
size in humans (one of the central phenomena which the CBH
was originally formulated to explain; Burkart et al., 2009) we
must determine what novel cognitive challenges our ancestors
faced (Tomasello et al., 2012). Put another way, we need to
establish how our ancestors’ ecology affected the beneﬁts of
investing differentially in brain size per se, rather than the
amount of resources available for investment in anything else.
As B&vS now clearly acknowledge that cooperative breeding
offers no new selective pressures favouring differential invest-
ment in brain size, the CBH offers no solution to this prob-
lem.
Journal of Zoology  (2016) – ª 2016 The Authors. Journal of Zoology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Zoological Society of London. 3
A. Thornton et al. Reply to Burkart & Van Schaik
Evidence
Comparative analyses by Isler & van Schaik (2012) suggest that
a higher incidence of allomaternal care (in which they include
paternal care, and so these ﬁndings could be driven as much by
biparental care as cooperative breeding) appears to be associated
with increased brain size in some mammalian groups. However,
it is notable that this relationship does not hold in primates, the
very group for which B&vS claim the evidence for the CBH is
strongest, and which they now suggest may even be the only
group in which the hypothesis holds. Indeed, evidence suggests
that the evolution of cooperative breeding in primates is linked
to greater fecundity (Garber, 1997; Harris et al., 2014; Garber
et al., 2016), not big brains: callitrichids, the only cooperatively
breeding primates other than ourselves, have the highest repro-
ductive output of any primates but relatively small brains for
their body mass (Reader & MacDonald, 2002).
The lack of any evidence linking cooperative breeding with
brain size evolution in non-human primates might naturally
lead one to question the utility of the CBH for explaining large
brains in humans. Nevertheless, claims that cooperative breed-
ing could be responsible for our large brains continue unabated
(Isler & van Schaik, 2012). B&vS highlight one possible
explanation for the lack of supporting evidence; could it be
that (other) cooperatively breeding primates simply have not
had sufﬁcient evolutionary time to evolve large brains? This
seems unlikely, given that the most recent common ancestor of
callitrichids and the independently breeding cebids is thought
to have lived around 20–22 Mya (Opazo et al., 2006), whereas
humans and chimpanzees diverged only ~6 Mya (Patterson
et al., 2006). The picture is similar in birds, where cooperative
breeding in the Corvida parvorder emerged around 30 Mya
(Edwards & Naeem, 1993), but is not associated with
increased brain size (Iwaniuk & Arnold, 2004). The most par-
simonious explanation for these patterns would seem to be that
cooperative breeding simply has not promoted the evolution of
differentially large brains.
Conclusion
We share with B&vS a strong interest in understanding how and
why cognitive traits evolve. However, we remain unconvinced by
the logic, assumptions and predictions of the CBH. The lack of
clarity regarding the predictions of the CBH is particularly prob-
lematic as it leaves it unclear what evidence would be required to
falsify it. For instance, does the CBH predict that cooperative
breeding should be linked to large brains? If so, isn’t it problem-
atic that cooperative breeding does not seem to be linked to large
brains? Does it predict increased cognitive ability, or simply
improved realized performance? If it predicts changes in ability,
why don’t cooperative breeders exhibit larger brains or special-
ized socio-cognitive mechanisms? If it predicts that cooperative
breeders should show improved cognitive performance without
improved cognitive ability, then why would the hypothesis pre-
dict that they should show the structures or mechanisms (e.g. lar-
ger brains, specialized teaching mechanisms) required to improve
cognitive abilities? Is the CBH a generalizable hypothesis, or
does it just apply to primates? If it just applies to primates, why
doesn’t it work in primates? Or does it perhaps just apply to
humans? If so, why should it just apply to humans, and how are
we to test it? To resolve this ambiguity regarding predictions, it
seems essential that any attempt to advance this hypothesis be
accompanied by a formal mathematical model, grounded in an
evolutionary cost-beneﬁt framework, that generates testable pre-
dictions based on explicitly stated assumptions.
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